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  Prediction markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the 
outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. Using these 
markets as forecasting tools could substantially improve decision making in the private 
and public sectors.  
 
We argue that U.S. regulators should lower barriers to the creation and design of 
prediction markets by creating a safe harbor for certain types of small stakes markets. We 
believe our proposed change has the potential to stimulate innovation in the design and 
use of prediction markets throughout the economy, and in the process to provide 

















The Promise of Prediction Markets 
 
 
  Prediction markets are forums for trading contracts that yield payments based on the 
outcome of uncertain events. There is mounting evidence that such markets can help to 
produce forecasts of event outcomes with a lower prediction error than conventional 
forecasting methods. For example, prediction market prices can be used to increase the 
accuracy of poll-based forecasts of election outcomes,
1 official corporate experts’ forecasts of 
printer sales, and statistical weather forecasts used by the National Weather Service.  
  Several researchers emphasize the potential of prediction markets to improve 
decisions.
2 The range of applications is virtually limitless–from helping businesses make 
better investment decisions to helping governments make better fiscal and monetary policy 
decisions.  
  Prediction markets have been used by decision makers in the U.S. Department of 
Defense,
3 the health care industry,
4 and multi-billion-dollar corporations such as Eli Lilly, 
General Electric, Google, France Telecom, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Siemens, 
and Yahoo.
5 The prices in these markets reflect employees’ expectations about the likelihood 
of a homeland security threat, the nationwide extent of a flu outbreak, the success of a new 
drug treatment, the sales revenue from an existing product, the timing of a new product 
launch, and the quality of a recently introduced software program.  
  These markets could assist private firms and public institutions in managing economic 
risks, such as declines in consumer demand, and social risks, such as flu outbreaks and 
environmental disasters, more efficiently. 
  Unfortunately, however, current federal and state laws limiting gambling create 
significant barriers to the establishment of vibrant, liquid prediction markets in the United 
States. We believe that regulators should lower these barriers by creating a legal safe harbor 
for specified types of small-stakes markets, stimulating innovation in both their design and 
their use.
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How and Why Prediction Markets Work 
 
  An example will help to clarify the prediction market concept. Consider a contract that 
pays $1 if Candidate X wins the presidential election in 2008. If the market price of an X 
contract is currently 53 cents, an interpretation is that the market “believes” X has a 53% 
chance of winning. Prediction markets reflect a fundamental principle underlying the value of 
market-based pricing: Because information is often widely dispersed among economic actors, 
it is highly desirable to find a mechanism to collect and aggregate that information. Free 
markets usually manage this process well because almost anyone can participate, while the 
potential for profit (and loss) creates strong incentives to search for better information. To be 
sure, a lively debate has arisen about whether prediction market prices are subject to various 
biases, which might diminish their accuracy as an aggregation mechanism.
7 However, 




  The use of prediction markets has been greatly deterred by state and federal laws 
restricting Internet gambling because at least some of these laws are plausibly understood to 
cast serious doubts on prediction markets. Currently eight states bar Internet gambling 
outright. In 2006, President Bush signed the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 
designed to crack down on such gambling. 
  The legal questions here are complex, but to create a prediction market in the United 
States that is unambiguously legal, one must run a regulatory gauntlet.
8 In principle, these 
difficulties could be avoided by creating prediction markets outside the United States, but this 
approach could suppress innovation and reduce opportunities to aggregate information and 
improve decisions. It would be better for U.S. authorities to clarify the circumstances under 
which prediction markets are plainly legal.  
 
Breaking the Legal Impasse 
 
  We suggest that two steps should be taken to facilitate the use of prediction markets 
while still meeting the legitimate concerns of lawmakers and regulators. 
                                                 
7 J. Wolfers, E. Zitzewitz, “Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabilities,” Stanford Graduate School of 
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  (i) The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), the federal regulatory 
agency that oversees futures market activity, should establish safe-harbor rules for selected 
small-stakes markets. One limited safe harbor is the no-action letter, in which the CFTC 
market oversight staff confirms in writing that it will not recommend enforcement action if 
the recipient acts in specified ways. The only prediction market to receive a no-action letter 
(in 1992) is the Iowa Electronic Markets,
9 which is run by professors at the University of 
Iowa and which initially focused on presidential elections. Although such no-action letters 
reduce the chances of legal action under other state and federal laws, they may not be 
adequate. We would therefore urge the CFTC to explore other approaches to ensuring safe 
harbors, for example, formal rules or guidance approved by the commission. 
  We suggest that three types of entities be eligible for safe harbor treatment. The first 
would be not-for-profit research institutions, including universities, colleges and think tanks 
wishing to operate exchanges similar to the Iowa Electronic Markets. The second would be 
government agencies seeking to do research similar to that of nongovernmental research 
institutions. The third group would consist of private businesses and not-for-profits that are 
not primarily engaged in research, which would only be allowed to operate internal prediction 
markets with their employees or contractors. 
  In all cases, markets would be limited to small-stakes contracts. Although the 
definition of small stakes is somewhat arbitrary, we use the term to mean an exchange in 
which the total amount of capital deposited by any one participant may not exceed some 
modest sum, perhaps something like $2,000 per year. 
  The exchanges themselves would be not-for-profit but would be allowed to charge 
modest fees to recoup administrative and regulatory costs. Brokers and paid advisers would 
be barred, reducing the risks that contracts would be sold to inappropriate or vulnerable 
customers or that customers would be charged fees above the amounts needed to maintain the 
markets. Exchanges would be self-regulated, leaving them with the responsibility to make 
reasonable efforts to keep markets free from fraud and manipulation. 
  For its part, the CFTC should allow contracts that price any economically meaningful 
event. This definition could allow for contracts on political events, environmental risks, or 
economic indicators, such as those offered by the Iowa Electronic Markets, but would 
presumably not include contracts on the outcomes of sports events.  
                                                 
9 No-action letter from Andrea M. Corcoran, Director, Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) 
Division of Trading and Markets, to George R. Neumann, Professor of Economics, University of Iowa (Feb. 5, 
1992), http://www.cftc.gov/files/foia/repfoia/foirf0503b002.pdf.  4 
  The contracts qualifying under this safe harbor would also create opportunities for 
more efficient risk allocation.
10 Although the small-stakes nature of these markets would 
necessarily limit their usefulness for hedging risk, they could serve as proofs of concept for 
larger-scale markets that could be developed under alternative regulatory arrangements. 
  The CFTC should allow researchers to experiment with several aspects of prediction 
markets – fee structures, incentives against manipulation, liquidity requirements and the like – 
with the goal of improving their design. Prediction markets are in an early stage, and if their 
promise is to be realized, researchers should be given flexibility to learn what kinds of design 
are most likely to produce accurate predictions. Of course, exchanges would need to inform 
their customers so that they are aware of the risks and benefits of participating in these 
markets. 
  (ii) Congress should support the CFTC’s efforts to develop prediction markets.
11 To 
the extent that the CFTC incurs costs in promoting innovation, Congress should provide the 
necessary funding. More fundamentally, Congress should explore alternative ways of 
securing a legal framework for prediction markets if the CFTC’s existing authority proves 
inadequate. In particular, Congress should specify that a no-action letter, or similar 
mechanism, preempts overlapping state and federal antigambling laws. Because Congress did 
not intend the CFTC to regulate gambling, it is important to design new regulations so that 





  We have suggested some modest reforms at the federal level that we hope will 
facilitate the development of prediction markets. These markets have great potential for 
improving social welfare in many domains. American leadership in this area is likely to 
encourage parallel efforts in other countries, speeding the development of this tool. The first 
step in helping prediction markets deliver on their promise is to clear away regulatory barriers 
that were never intended to inhibit socially productive innovation.  
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11 On May 1, 2008, the CFTC requested public comment on the appropriate regulatory treatment of prediction 
markets. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), ‘‘Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory 
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